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VORTEX CASES: AT A TURBULENT CROSSROADS
PHILIP SILVERMAN*
In recent years a number of air crashes have been attributed to
wake turbulence. In this article Mr. Philip Silverman discusses the
legal aspects of the wake turbulence problem. The duty of air traf-
fic controllers to warn of possible wake turbulence and the nature
of that warning are examined herein. Mr. Silverman analyzes the
contradictory cases in this area and suggests that in the future the
Government will have more success in defending claims brought
on this basis.
T HE ADVENT of wide-bodied, super-size aircraft has given
rise to great concern regarding the hazards of wake turbulence
to light aircraft. This concern was highly intensified when a DC-9
crashed while on approach following the approach of a DC-10 to
the same runway.' The National Transportation Safety Board de-
termined that the "probable cause" of the crash of the DC-9 was
an encounter with vortex turbulence generated by the preceding
DC-10.'
Vortex turbulence was a problem prior to the introduction of the
latest generation of heavy jet aircraft, and the record of litigation
demonstrates that the United States Government has borne the
* Mr. Silverman is associated with Speiser, Krause & Madole, in Washington,
D.C. The author is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School, LL.B., 1949; LL.M.,
1951, and is a member of the New York and District of Columbia bar. From
1960 to 1962, he served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern
District of New York. He then joined the Department of Justice in Washington,
D.C., and from 1962-1972 was a member of the Aviation Litigation Unit, de-
fending the Government in aviation cases throughout the United States, including
wake turbulence cases. He served as Chief of the Aviation Litigation Unit from
1970-1972.
1 The crash occurred on May 30, 1972, at Greater Southwest Airport, Fort
Worth, Texas. The DC-9 which crashed was preceded by a DC-10, also on a
training flight, which had made a "touch and go" landing just prior to the landing
approach of the DC-9 to the same runway.
INTSB REP., NTSB-AAR 73-3 (Adopted Mar. 13, 1973).
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major financial responsibility for such accidents. In a paper sub-
mitted at a recent Federal Aviation Agency symposium on the
topic of wake turbulence, one writer stated:
More than $3,000,000 have [sic] been paid by the United States
Government in judgments in the past three years in wake turbu-
lence cases. These recent cases seem to set a trend extending and
broadening the Government's liability where the controller's act is
judged to be negligent
Though the United States continues to bear the brunt of such
litigation,' the last year has seen a definite change in the trend of
these cases. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lightenburger v. United
States has had the greatest impact. The district court held that the
controller should have given a warning, although there was a twelve
to fourteen minute separation between an American Airlines 707
and a Cessna 310 that was attempting a precision approach under
adverse weather conditions. The Cessna 310 encountered the vortex
turbulence from the preceding B-707 which had executed a missed
approach. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the con-
troller should only give a warning if he foresees the possibility of
turbulence being a hazard. It noted that the existence of such
turbulence is not necessarily foreseeable, particularly when there
is a twelve to fourteen minute separation as existed in that case
Wake turbulence is a movement of air behind an aircraft. It is
invisible to pilot and controller alike. It is not predictable since it
is subject to ambient wind; its effect and strength will differ with
the size, flap configuration, weight and speed of the aircraft pro-
ducing it. It develops when air rolls up off the wingtips of an
aircraft in flight due to the pressure differentials above and below
the wing surface, forming two counter-rotating cylindrical vortices
which are commonly called wake turbulence. It is much more
severe than "prop wash,"' and can induce an aircraft to roll beyond
3How The Courts Look At Wake Turbulence, by Richard H. Jones, FAA
Symposium, March 24, 1971.
SThis writer knows of no reported case in the United States in which the pilot
was sued alone and recovery had. There are presently between 10-15 wake turbu-
lence cases pending against the United States in various districts.
5460 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1972), reversing 298 F. Supp. 813 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
6 1d. at 395.
1 "Prop Wash" is the air pushed back by the rotation of the propellers, which
have a much smaller surface area than a wing. "Prop Wash is less severe; it takes
less time to dissipate." Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1968).
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its control capability. Some measurements have shown peak veloc-
ities of the tangential air movements surrounding a vortex core to
be as high as 224 feet per second-or 133 knots.'
Thirteen years ago the FAA instituted a procedure requiring the
controller to issue a caution (using words such as "caution, wake
turbulence") if he foresees the possibility that wake turbulence
might have an effect on another aircraft. The inclusion of this
procedure "coincidentally" followed the decision in Johnson v.
United States,' which involved the crash of a light Cessna aircraft
following the approach of a B-47 bomber. The plaintiffs claimed
that the Cessna had encountered wake turbulence from the B-47
and that the controller was negligent in not warning of its effect.
The Government countered that the Cessna had stalled on the
approach, and the manual didn't provide for giving such warnings
anyway. The court obviously was not sure; therefore, basing its
decision on the "stall" theory, found for the Government. In
dicta, however, the court noted that the manuals should provide
for wake turbulence warnings.
The first warning procedure was put into effect on February 1,
1961. It read:
When controllers foresee the possibility that departing or arriving
aircraft might encounter rotorcraft downwash, thrust stream tur-
bulence or wing tip vortices from preceding aircraft cautionary
information to this effect should be issued to pilots. NOTE: Since
the existence and effect of turbulence is unpredictable, the provision
of the above information does not constitute the placing of respon-
sibility on controllers to anticipate in all cases the need for such
information.'
In addition, another section of the procedure manual designated the
specific language, "CAUTION, TURBULENCE (Traffic informa-
tion),"" to be used when warning a pilot. The traffic information
referred to the aircraft generating the potentially dangerous tur-
"FAA Advisory Circular, AC 90-23D (Dec. 15, 1972).
'183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
"Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, ATM-2-A § 411.7, Rev. 1.
" Air Traffic Procedures Manual, ATM-2-A § 439.18, Rev. 1.
439.18-To issue cautionary information regarding possible roto-
craft downwash, thrust stream turbulence, and/or wing tip vortices:
CAUTION, TURBULENCE (Traffic information).
EXAMPLE: CAUTION, TURBULENCE, DEPARTING
AMERICAN ELECTRA.
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bulence. Though much litigation based on this provision has fol-
lowed, there is but a mere handful of reported cases.
The decision in Furumizo v. United States" was the first in this
field that had substantial impact. In that case the controller used
the exact language of the handbook when he warned a light aircraft
about the wake turbulence of a preceding DC-8. Nevertheless,
Furumizo, a student with an instructor pilot on board, took off
and apparently encountered the turbulence that caused him to crash.
In a lengthy decision the district court reviewed Federal Aviation
Agency internal documents which indicated a growing concern
with accidents in which wake turbulence encounters were sus-
pected (and which had undoubtedly played a part in the addition
of the warning provision in the manual), including the separation
minima set forth in the manual and the underlying statutes giving
the Administrator authority to determine what procedures to pro-
mulgate. ' In finding liability, the court held that since no specific
standard was set forth in the regulations for separating aircraft on
intersecting runways, the matter of separation was left to the dis-
cretion of the controllers; the pilots, according to the court, did not
know that a clearance was an authorization only and not a com-
mand that could be rejected.' The court found the controller
negligent because he gave the warning without exercise of judg-
ment; rather, the warning issued was "simply a slavish purported
following of the 'book' with no attempt to exercise a judgment"
and the reasonable exercise of judgment would have been to at-
tempt to "hold up the clearance" in order to "minimize the acute
danger.""
2
While one may be contented with the result in Furumizo, the
reasoning seemed a little strained. The court had chosen to dis-
regard other provisions of the regulations stating that the pilot in
command of an aircraft (in this case the instructor pilot advising
Furumizo, the student pilot) "shall be directly responsible for its
operation and shall have final authority as to operation of the
aircraft."'" The court also disregarded the definition of a clearance
12245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965), afl'd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
The accident occurred on June 19, 1961, at Honolulu.
"1245 F. Supp. at 998-1008.
14 1d. at 1011.
I Id. at 992.
Is 14 C.F.R. S 60.2 (1961) (emphasis added).
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found in the then operative Civil Air Regulations:
Air Traffic Clearance: Authorization by air traffic control, for the
purpose of preventing collision between known aircraft, for an
aircraft to proceed under specific traffic conditions within a control
zone or control area.17
Further, the regulations provided that:
When an air traffic clearance has been obtained. .. the pilot in
command shall not deviate from the provisions thereof unless an
amended clearance is obtained ... "
Thus, it is obvious that a clearance was authorization to proceed in
relation to traffic conditions for the purpose of preventing collisions
between aircraft; the pilot had final authority for the operation of
his aircraft including the authority to obtain a different clearance.
The court's reference to a "slavish" following of the book ap-
pears to be a bit of unwarranted sophistry. Obviously, judgment
was exercised in giving the warning, since the procedure called
for it only if the controller "foresee[s] the possibility" that a de-
parting aircraft might encounter wing tip vortices from a preceding
aircraft. 9 The controller had to foresee, i.e. evaluate the possi-
bility of wing tip vortex, encounter and then decide whether to
issue a warning, notwithstanding the fact that the phenomenon
was unpredictable and could not be anticipated in all cases."0
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, stating:
The government maintains that giving this type of clearance trans-
ferred to the pilot of the Piper, or left with him the sole responsi-
bility for avoiding the danger. No doubt he had the responsibility. 1
The result might have been different if the court had stopped at
this point. But, the court continued as follows:
[A]nd it may be (we do not decide) that if, after giving the warn-
1714 C.F.R. S 60.60 (1961).
1s 14 C.F.R. § 60.21 (1961).
19Para. 411.7 Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, ATM-2-A, Rev. 1, at
page 4 supra.
20 It is worth noting at this time that the Administrator could have provided
a procedure making such warnings mandatory in all cases in accordance with the
authority and discretion delegated to him by Congress. 18 USC 1348(c) effective
1961.
21 United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1967), citing United
States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
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ing, the attention of the controllers had been diverted elsewhere,
either by their duties or even fortuitously, so that they did not see
the Piper in disregard of the warning, the United States would not
be liable. But we are unwilling to hold as the government would
have us do that when the controller did see the Piper start its take-
off, they had no duty to act. The danger was extreme and they
knew it. Nothing in the manual says that under such circumstances
the controller shall not act.'
In rejecting the Government's argument that, having foreseen the
possibility and done what was called for, the controller had no
further duty the court concluded:
But we do not think this directive is fully complied with where,
although a first warning has been given, it becomes clear to the
controller that another warning is needed and none is given. '
In retrospect, it was pure speculation and guesswork on the part
of the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the pilots would have heeded
a second warning had it been given.
The circumlocution of both the Ninth Circuit and the district
court in Furumizo seemed clearly at odds with the decision in
Franklin v. United States," in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a
decision holding the controller negligent for failing to give a warn-
ing concerning helicopter vortices. While the lower court in Fur-
umizo held the controller to a standard of care greater than was
set out in his manual, the Seventh Circuit stated:
The findings of the district court must be considered in the light
of general principles of negligence applicable to air traffic control.
In the absence of a special statute, the ordinary rules of tort law
apply to aircraft accidents.'
Thus while the Seventh Circuit accepted the principles laid down
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mille?' (that the ordinary
rules of tort law applied), the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the lower
court in Furumizo, apparently departed from its own rulings to
put a greater duty on the controller, i.e. requiring extra warnings,
2 Id. (emphasis added).
23381 F.2d at 968.
24342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844 (1965).
-342 F.2d at 584, citing United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1962).
2 6303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1962).
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beyond the general principles of negligence applicable to air traf-
fic control.
The next two cases on point were Hartz v. United States," and
Wasilko v. United States."
The conclusions reached in these cases conflict with each other
and with Furumizo. In the Hartz case,2 the Fifth Circuit reversed
a district court decision in favor of the Government. The passenger
and the pilot were allowed to recover under the law of Georgia!*
because the controller said, "Watch the prop wash," instead of
"Caution, turbulence," when he cleared the aircraft to takeoff."1
The finding of controller negligence can be readily understood by
recognizing that the warning was inadequate since it referred to
"prop wash" instead of "turbulence."
The lower court found that the controller had intended to warn
about all the turbulence in the wake of the preceding aircraft when
he cautioned about "prop wash." The plaintiffs argued on appeal
that there was a vast difference between "prop wash," which dis-
sipates a few hundred feet behind the generating aircraft, and
turbulence, which has different physical characteristics and is
more hazardous. In reversing, the Fifth Circuit found that the
controller was negligent because he did not follow the exact lan-
guage provided in the manual, i.e. "CAUTION, TURBULENCE"" (sug-
gesting a requirement for "slavishly" adhering to the requirements
of the manual).
While finding the controller negligent for not using the exact
language provided in the manual, the Fifth Circuit specifically
disapproved of the lower court's view, bottomed on the language
in, the Franklin case, that no duty existed independent of the duty
created by the procedures manual. The appellate panel wrote:
The trial court concluded that no duty existed 'independent of the
duty created by the procedures manual.' We disapprove the view
1 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965), rev'd, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968),
modified, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969).
28300 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 412 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969).
2 The Hartz accident occurred November 10, 1961, at Atlanta, Georgia.
"Georgia follows the doctrine of comparative negligence between a plaintiff
and defendant. GA. CODE ANNOT. § 94-703 (1965).
"Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, ATM-2-A, Rev. 1. See also note 10
supra.
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that the duty of an FAA controller is circumscribed within the
narrow limits of an operations manual and nothing more. We
approve of the view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ....
The court went on to accept the view the Second Circuit adopted
in Ingham v. United States.' There the Government was held
liable under a provision in the manual that provided for informa-
tion to be given to a flight concerning changes in weather condi-
tions when the controller thought it was necessary to the flight.
The controller had failed to advise Eastern Flight 512 of a change
in visibility from one mile to three-fourths of a mile because it was
still above the minima required for the approach."
The district court found that the pilot, Mr. Hartz, was experi-
enced since he had over 2,000 hours flight time,"0 a subscription
to the Flight Information Manual," and membership in the Air-
craft Owners and Pilots Association." The court pointed out that
the pilot handbook for the aircraft, a Bonanza H-35, specifically
warned about the hazards of wake turbulence. Thus the district
court found specifically that the pilot had knowledge of and was
aware of the hazard of wake turbulence" (unlike the stipulation
-" Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 1968), citing Ingham
v. Eastern Air Lines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
34373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
In spite of the testimony of an Eastern Air Lines' training supervisor that
he would have expected the captain to attempt the approach even if he had been
advised of the change, this "proximate cause" issue was resolved against the
United States.
36Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119, 125 (N.D. Ga. 1965), rev'd,
387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969).
"' Since 1956, the FAA-issued Flight Information Manual, now the Airman's
Information Manual, had contained a paragraph in the "Good Operating Prac-
tices" section which read in part as follows:
Turbulence caused by large aircraft can be severe and is capable
of causing complete loss of control to light aircraft. Under certain
conditions, particularly calm air, the turbulence caused by large
aircraft can remain in an area for several minutes. Be on the alert
for first sign of turbulence when taking-off and landing behind
large aircraft; allow adequate spacing, maintain higher than nor-
mal speeds, use the windward side of runway, and maintain a flight
path to the windward, of the preceding aircraft. . ..
, Three issues of the AOPA magazine, THE PILOT, containing articles on
"Wake Turbulence" were placed in evidence.
" Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119, 125 (N.D. Ga. 1965), rev'd,
387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969).
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and finding by the court of no knowledge in Furumizo').
The Fifth Circuit, though reversing for controller negligence,
found that the negligence of the controller was "a proximate cause"
of the accident.' It in no way disturbed the findings of the district
court as to the pilot's knowledge of the hazard of wake turbulence.
Thus, on remand for the purpose of determining damages,"' the
Government's position was that the pilot's negligence was equal to
the controller's, and, under the comparative negligence law of
Georgia, the claim should be defeated. The court, however, ruled
that the the pilot was twenty-five per cent negligent and deducted
that percentage from the basic award.' Both sides appealed.
On the second appeal," the Fifth Circuit, in construing the
"carefully chosen language"' of the first opinion that, "[t]he con-
troller's breach of duty clearly was a proximate cause of the
crash...,"" now decided that on the basis of the whole decision
by the first panel, the sole cause of the crash was the Government
negligence, notwithstanding the experience and knowledge of the
pilot. How three experienced appellate judges could make the
mistake, in what the second panel characterized as their "carefully
chosen language," between the use of the term "a proximate cause"
and "the proximate cause" was not explained.
But in the case of Wasilko v. United States,' in which the crash
also occurred on an intersection takeoff, no recovery was allowed
for the pilot when it was shown, as in the Hartz case, that the pilot
was familiar with the hazards of wake turbulence from his military
amd Civil Air Patrol experience, even though no warning at all
had been given to the pilot. Indeed, the court wrote:
The clearance to use an intersection takeoff did not relieve Pilot
Wasilko from his final authority and responsibility in the control
'0Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 991 (D. Hawaii 1965).
41Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1968).
The passenger's case was easily disposed of by the court on the remand,
and no appeal taken from this award. See 10 Av. L. REP. 18,209 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
"IHartz v. United States, 10 Av. L. REP. 18,209 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
"Only one member of the original three judge panel which had heard the
first appeal, heard the second appeal.
IHartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 1969).
41 Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
17 300 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Ohio 1967), af0'd, 412 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969).
This crash occurred at Cleveland, Ohio on October 27, 1961, just 14 days before
the Hartz crash.
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and operation of his plane. Nor was the intersection takeoff clear-
ance an order that he was blindly bound to follow.'8
Further, the court stated:
With final authority and responsibility for the operation of his
Beechcraft Bonanza resting on Pilot Wasilko, it is concluded he
could not rely on the tower's clearance or absence of cautionary
wing tip vortex warning as a legal excuse for not exercising due
care for his own safety."
The court in Wasilko, however, did allow recovery for the pilot's
ten-year-old son who accompanied him and was also killed in the
crash.
On appeal, the Government argued that in light of the pilot's
knowledge of the hazard, the absence of a warning could not be a
proximate cause. This was the same argument that was ignored in
the Hartz case. The Sixth Circuit, however, dodged the issue com-
pletely, and, in a per curiam decision, merely decided that none
of the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous and left the
parties as they were.
These four cases, Furumizo, Hartz, Franklin, and Wasilko pre-
sent a paradox. In Franklin, the court concluded that ordinary
rules of negligence applied to air traffic control. Yet in Furumizo
and Hartz the courts sought to enlarge the controller's duties be-
yond the standards of care set up by the Administrator in the
manuals. In Furumizo, the controller had followed all the proce-
dures exactly as required, yet the Government was held liable; in
Hartz, the Government was held liable for not following the pro-
cedures exactly. In Wasilko the pilot was not allowed to recover
because of his knowledge of the vortex phenomenon and the fact
that final authority rested with him; in Hartz, the pilot who also
had the same final authority and was acknowledged to be experi-
enced, was completely exculpated. It seemed that the Government
would be held liable in any turbulence case almost on a "no fault"
basis, and the inconsistencies in Furumizo, Hartz and Wasilko
would make the Government's defense of a vortex case impossible.
The Lightenburger decision presented an even greater anomaly.
As was mentioned earlier, the lower court held there was a wake
"' Wasilko v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 573, 598 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
4I Id. at 599.
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turbulence encounter even though twelve to fourteen minutes sep-
arated the alleged generating aircraft and the accident aircraft, and
that even under those circumstances, the pilot of the twin engine
Cessna 310 aircraft should have been given a warning. It also found
the controller negligent for not using prescribed language for term-
inating the PAR (Precision Approach Radar) approach that the
Cessna was attempting to execute, and for giving additional assist-
nce to the flight beyond the middle marker.
The Ninth Circuit, in reviewing the district court's lengthy
decision, "accepted" the court's finding of a wake turbulence en-
counter"0 stating, inter alia:
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) and the PAR controllers
working with the FAA have a duty to warn a pilot when it appears
to them that the pilot may encounter a wing tip vortex. 1
Thus the court acknowledged that a warning was not mandatory
in every instance. The court went on to discuss the unforeseeability
that such turbulence would last for twelve to fourteen minutes. But
more importantly, the court also found that the failure to use the
exact language in terminating the approach was not a proximate
cause of the crash. In this regard the court continued:
Even if we assume that it was negligence not to have issued the
warning [that the plane was beyond the middle marker and below
the glide path] with the precise terminology of the regulation,
there was no causal connection between such negligence and the
crash .... Although the court speculated that the failure to use uni-
form phraseology 'might induce confusion and disorientation' ...
or 'possibly... disorientation'.., there was no finding that Gor-
don became disoriented, and such a finding would have been in-
consistent with the Court's other finding: [that the plane was
uncontrollable because of a vortex encounter]."
The court reversed the finding of Government liability on the
ground it was clearly erroneous.
Additional cases, all decided in 1972, have focused the respon-
sibility for wake turbulence avoidance on the pilot. One factor
influencing the changing trend may be that since the earlier deci-
50 Lightenburger v. United States, 460 F.2d 391, 394 (9th Cir. 1972).
51 Id., citing United States v. Furumizo, 245 F. Supp. 981, aff'd, 381 F.2d 965
(9th Cir. 1967).
52 Id. at 397.
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sions in Furumizo, Hartz, and Wasilko the FAA has embarked
on a broad educational program in an attempt to familiarize pilots
with the hazards of wake turbulence and methods of avoidance. In
1965, the FAA distributed a small booklet entitled "Wake Turbu-
lence" to all active pilots, i.e. those who had pilot certificates with
current medical certificates." A film was produced and circulated
throughout the country and safety seminars and meetings were
held. The Airmans Information Manual, Part I included a full
explanation of wake turbulence and avoidance procedures.
Thus, in Thingulstad v. United States," the district court, finding
in favor of the United States, wrote:
The primary responsibility for the safe operation of an aircraft is
upon the pilot .... Moreover, the pilot must exercise ordinary care
for his own safety under the circumstances which confront him ....
All of the information contained in FAA Advisory Circular AC
90-23A (plaintiff's exhibit 9), concerning the nature and danger
of wing tip vortices is chargeable to pilot Thingulstad.... This
pilot had been flying since 1957, and, according to his wife's
testimony, received and regularly read various publications directed
to pilots. At least one of these publications, the August 1965 issue
of the A.O.P.A. Pilot Magazine, was admitted into evidence as
government's exhibit M and contained an article detailing the
danger of wake turbulence."
In Sanbutch Properties v. United States," an experienced pilot
flying into San Francisco International Airport crashed when he
encountered wake turbulence. The controller had given no warn-
ing." The court, in finding for the Government, discussed the
relative duties of the controller and the pilot:
The pilot of 53Q:
(a) Had a duty to be aware of the hazard of wake turbulence;
(b) Had a duty to be aware of the procedures recommended for
avoidance of wake turbulence, and was aware of them;
"This testimony was given by James W. Nimmo during the Lightenburger
trial. Some of Mr. Nimmo's testimony was discussed by the Ninth Circuit. See
•460 F.2d at 395.
1343 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio 1972). See Gill v. United States, 285 F. Supp.
253 (E.D. Tex. 1968); Wasilko v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Ohio
1967), aff'd, 412 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1969).
"Thingulstad v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 551, 556-7 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
56343 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
This case involved a claim for property damage only.
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(c) Had a duty to obtain all available information concerning the
flight, including weather and wind information;
(d) Had a duty to comply with authorizations, clearances and in-
structions of Air Traffic Control; and
(e) Had a duty to operate the aircraft in a careful manner so as
not to endanger the life or property of another.
If the controller has a reasonable basis to give an advisory, he
should give it. If he has no reasonable basis, he should not....
The procedures under which air traffic controllers engage in the
providing of advice and assistance to pilots do not impose an abso-
lute duty to warn of the hazard of wake turbulence, but rather
provide for the discretionary transmission of an advisory, which is
wholly secondary to the avoidance responsibility of the pilot. The
failure to transmit a discretionary advisory, or warning, to a pilot
of the hazard of wake turbulence where the air traffic personnel
are fully engaged in the performance of duties having a higher
priority, cannot be the proximate or concurring proximate cause
of an accident resulting from an encounter with wake turbulence
where the pilot knew, or should have known, of the hazards and
avoidance procedures, and was on notice and aware of the pres-
ence and proximity of generating aircraft. 8
In Robinson, et al. v. United States," the first case involving a
Jfight service station, plaintiffs claimed that the flight service spe-
cialist had been negligent in failing to warn of wake turbulence.
The turbulence was claimed to have caused the crash of a Beech
Queenaire even though a four to five minute separation was
:;hown."° Since it was about two o'clock a.m., the tower was not
in operation. The flight service station manual provided that wake
turbulence advisories are part of the airport advisory to a landing
aircraft, if the specialist foresees the possibility that turbulence
might be a hazard. The court rejected the claim that there had
been a wake turbulence encounter, finding in part:
25. The absence of a warning concerning wake turbulence or that
the DC-9 had made a low approach 5 minutes before is not negli-
gence under the facts and circumstances above found to exist.
26. Even if there was a wake turbulence encounter, the absence
"1343 F. Supp. at 616.
"The crash occurred at Mobile, Alabama on August 26, 1969. The plaintiffs
were from Texas and the case was tried in Dallas.
60 This separation was between the Queenaire and the preceding DC-9 which
was on a training flight and executing touch and go's or missed approaches to
the runway.
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of a warning when there was a five minute time lapse between the
two aircrafts is not unreasonable under the facts.
27. Even if there was a wake turbulence encounter, the absence
of a warning was not negligence and was not a proximate cause
of the accident as the FSS operator could not have reasonably
been expected to foresee any such wake turbulence encounter in
this case."'
As a matter of law the court also concluded that:
3. The pilot in command is responsible for and the final author-
ity as to the safe operation of the aircraft and on the occasion in
question here he had full control over the aircraft at the time of
and just preceding the crash.
4. A Flight Service Specialist is not responsible for the safe
operation of the aircraft by the pilot.
5. There is a duty to warn of wake turbulence only if it is rea-
sonably foreseeable, which depends on the circumstances in each
case.62
On May 4, 1973, less than a month after the appeal was argued,
the Fifth Circuit, per curiam, affirmed the decision."5
Of even greater interest is the Canadian opinion in Sexton et al.
and Wilson v. Boak et al.," because it was decided even before
the reversal in Lightenburger, or the decisions in Thingulstad,
Sanbutch, and Robinson. The Canadian court in Sexton, however,
did have the benefit of the decisions in Hartz, Johnson, Wasilko,
and Lightenburger. Yet the court, even though concluding there
was a wake turbulence encounter but no warning, wrote:
From listening to the tape and reading the material it is appar-
ent that an economy of transmissions must be imposed if the
tower is to deal with those transmissions essential to its function.
To require of the controller that he foresee and warn the pilot of
any possibility of error on his part would render impossible any
practical use of the airport. If someone could not get on the air it
might well be argued that unnecessary talk constituted negligence.
In 1968 it was well-known that the 707 was a hazard to the Aztec
in the form of a strip at least five miles long and there was no
61 Robinson v. United States, CA 3-3984-A, statement of facts (N.D. Tex.)
(not otherwise reported).
" Robinson v. United States, CA 3-3984-A, conclusions of law (N.D. Tex.)
(not otherwise reported).
63Robinson v. United States, Docket 72-3176 (5th Cir. 1973) (not yet re-
ported).
"12 Av. L. REP. 17,851 (1972).
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need to remind the pilot of the obvious. Visibility was good and
visual flight rules were in effect.
It is my view that, prior to landing clearance and while on visual
flight rules, responsibility for adequate separation lies with the
pilot. In none of the great number of exhibits relative to airman-
ship and procedure at airports is it suggested that the tower should
warn of turbulence or prescribe separation distances prior to land-
ing clearance.
There was no evidence from the pilots called that they had
ever heard a tower warn of turbulence on initial or approach
clearance. Nor was there any evidence suggesting a basis for the
tower assuming any responsibility regarding separation distance
except on, and immediately adjacent to, the runway."
The controversy, however, is by no means resolved. In another
recent decision, Yates v. United States," the Government was held
liable for failing to give a warning, when a Cessna 172 was fol-
lowing a TWA Boeing 707. The transmission by the controller to
"[k]eep your traffic in close behind behind that TWA jet, there's
others behind you""7 was crucial to the court's decision. The court,
however, seemed to think that in order for the Cessna to land on
the runway and avoid any turbulence encounter from the jet that
had preceded it, the Cessna had to leap-frog over the jet."
All the cases reported emphasize the underlying conflict of
controller versus pilot and the issue of warning as opposed to no
warning. The National Transportation Safety Board in its report
on the DC-9 accident at Ft. Worth, capsulized the problem when
it wrote:
3. Finally, the flightcrew's complacent attitude toward the tower
controller's "caution turbulence" advisory might have resulted from
the "cry wolf" syndrome. This syndrome might well have existed
in this case because the crew of the DC-9 had successfully com-
pleted two approaches behind the DC-10 without apparent dif-
ficulty. Frequent caution advisories without resultant encounter
with a vortex may lead pilots to disregard such notices."9
The above comment, however, misses the mark since the pur-
pose of a warning, if given, is to alert or remind the pilot to utilize
1 Id. at 17,856-57.
61 12 Av. L. REP. 17,921 (D. New Mexico 1972).
"Id. at 17,924 (Finding of fact, #31).
18 Id. (finding of fact, #30).
19 NTSB Report, AAR 73-3 at 15.
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procedures to avoid any encounter. Thus the lack of a resultant
encounter with a vortex is exactly the result desired.
Thus the key issue in vortex litigation will continue to be
whether a warning should have been given. It now seems clear
that a party seeking recovery when a warning was given has a
formidable task, although depending on circumstances, the ques-
tion will remain whether the controller, in giving the warning,
was "slavishly" adhering to the manual or creating a "cry wolf"
syndrome. Nevertheless, in cases when warnings have been given
and even more importantly when no warning was given the issues
of the pilot's experience, familiarity with the airport, and correct-
ness of the warning will remain subjects on which litigation may
turn. For example, in Yates, a no warning case, though the investi-
gation and testimony revealed that the pilot was knowledgeable
concerning wake turbulence the court obviously took into con-
sideration that the decedent was a "low time" pilot."
Since the giving of a warning remains a matter of discretion
with the controller, based upon the circumstances under which he
is operating in the tower, it appears that the most reasonable rule
for the courts to follow in evaluating whether a warning was
appropriate, or its omission negligent, is conclusion number five in
the Robinson case, that: "There is a duty to warn of wake turbu-
lence only if it is reasonably foreseeable, which depends on the cir-
cumstances in each case."71 The circumstances to be considered will
include, inter alia, the weather conditions, time and distance separa-
tion of air traffic, type and position of aircraft in the traffic pattern,
visibility, the controller's general experience, the history of arrivals
and departures before the accident being litigated, and which of
these factors, if any, the controller considered.
The Government will continue to have its responsibilities for
giving warnings tested, although it may become increasingly dif-
ficult to sustain a wake turbulence case against the United States
because of the recent decisions that limit the duty of the controller
to anticipate a vortex encounter and place a greater burden on
the pilot to avoid such encounters. Plaintiffs will also have to meet
70Yates v. United States, 12 Av. L. REP. 17,921, 17,925 (1972) (finding of
fact, #43).
71 Robinson v. United States, CA 3-3984-A (N.D. Tex.) (not otherwise re-
ported).
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a greater burden to show that a vortex encounter actually did
occur, in contrast to the type of testimony, often presented during
trials in which this writer represented the Government, generally
to the effect that (i) the plane was seen to wobble and gyrate
and, (ii) an expert opinion that the accident was caused by a
wake turbulence encounter. Since the FAA has done more re-
search and is now more knowledgeable in this area, turbulence
cases will require more skilled preparation in all respects to counter
the Government's defense that there was in fact no wake turbu-
lence encounter.
But even if a vortex encounter is shown under conditions where
no warning was given, it may not necessarily result in Government
liability because much of the emphasis has been transferred to the
pilot. Thus, in appropriate cases, greater consideration will be
given to making the pilot, flying school, or air taxi service a
defendant as well as the Government.
Although the FAA originally emphasized the hazard of wake
turbulence to aircraft that were taking off or landing,"' with the
advent of TCA's (Terminal Control Areas) in places such as
Washington, D.C., Miami, Boston, San Francisco, and other large
airports that attempt to control different types of aircraft at dif-
ferent altitudes within an enlarged control area or control zone
by use of radar vectors, the phenomenon of vortex turbulence must
be assessed with respect to its relationship to air traffic control
system capacity, in both terminal and en route operations.
As long as there is mixed traffic in terminal areas there will
continue to be wake turbulence cases. All wake turbulence cases
except Wenniger v. United States,"' have occurred during landings
or takeoffs. The new concepts and developments in navigation
procedures will create new possibilities of wake turbulence en-
counter even away from airports. The new era of jumbo jets will
make such encounters inevitable even when traffic separation and
72 The first provision for warning dealt with only "departing or arriving" air-
craft.
73234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965). Al-
thought the court in Thingulstad v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 551 (S.D. Ohio
1972), treated the case as an "en route" accident, the aircraft in that case was
in communication with the tower and on approach for landing. The airplane in
the Wenniger case was a truly en route aircraft which had not filed any flight
plan and did not communicate with any air traffic control facility.
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a warning is afforded, as was demonstrated in the recent Ft. Worth
accident."4
We can continue to look for wake turbulence cases in all areas,
but the trend against the Government will ease sufficiently to per-
mit a greater sharing of responsibility by pilots, and the flying
schools and air taxi operators that employ them.
71 See note 2 supra.
